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Abstract
We introduce a simple procedure to be used for selecting the strategies most likely to be
played by inexperienced agents who interact in one shot 2x2 games. We start with an axiomatic
description of a function that may capture players’ beliefs. Various proposals connected with
the concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium do not match this description. On the other
hand minimax regret obeys all the axioms. Therefore we use minimax regret to approximate
players’ beliefs and we let players best respond to these conjectured beliefs. When compared
with existing experimental evidences about one shot matching pennies games, this procedure
correctly indicates the choices of the vast majority of the players. Applications to other classes
of games are also explored.
Keywords: prediction, beliefs, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, minimax regret, matching
pennies, experiments.
JEL classification: C72, C91.
1 Introduction
How should an inexperienced agent who is facing a simple strategic situation, like for instance a
one shot 2x2 game, decide which strategy to play? A rational, or Bayesian, approach for dealing
with such a decision under uncertainty (in a spirit similar to Savage, 1954) would be the following:
∗Contact: Seminar for Economic Theory, Ludwig Maximilians University (LMU), Ludwigstrasse 28 (Rgb), 80539
Munich. Email: andrea.gallice@eui.eu.
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1 - the player forms a belief about what his opponent will play.
2 - the player chooses the strategy which best responds to this belief.
Interpreting it as a heuristics and acknowledging players’ heterogeneity, this rule cannot be
expected to describe the behavior of every single agent. Still some recent papers confirm that
in simple strategic interactions the majority of individuals behave coherently with their beliefs.1
Nyarko and Schotter (2002) study a 60 times repeated 2x2 game and find that around 75% of the
players do indeed best respond to their stated beliefs. For the case of 3x3 games, Rey-Biel (2004)
considers 10 one shot games and finds a similar rate of compliance while 55% is the percentage
found by Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2005) using data about 14 (more complex) one shot
games. It is therefore a conservative guess to expect that, in one shot 2x2 games, at least half
of the individuals play consistently with their beliefs. We want to capture the behavior of this
majority of players.
In order to do so we initially focus on the process of beliefs formation. The goal is to find
a function that may approximate players’ beliefs without the need of having to explicitly elicit
them. Using an axiomatic approach we first list a limited number of desirable properties that,
in accordance with experimental studies and behavioral regularities, a belief function must fulfill.
Then, we check some existing concepts commonly used in game theory and decision theory to see
which of them, if any, fulfills all the requirements.
We first show that, contrary to a very authoritative strand of research (starting with Aumann,
1987, who simplified Harsanyi, 1973), the concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is not a
suitable candidate for approximating players’ beliefs. Indeed mixed equilibria are still problematic
both in theory and in practice (see the literature review). In particular some features of mixed
equilibria clearly contradict our axiomatic description.
At the opposite we find minimax regret (a criterion for dealing with choices under uncertainty
originally proposed by Savage, 1951) to be the unique candidate to obey all the axioms. Therefore
we propose minimax regret as a proxy for players’ beliefs and we claim that the majority of players
play “as if” they were best responding to these approximated beliefs.
This conjecture is tested in the second part of the paper. The predictions stemming from the
procedure (best respond to beliefs equal to the minimax regret distribution of the opponent) are
compared with experimental evidences about different versions of 2x2 one shot matching pennies
games. To forecast players’ choices in this class of games can be particularly problematic because
the Nash indication is often misleading (see for instance Ochs, 1995 and Goeree and Holt, 2001).
Our procedure proves to be an effective way to identify the strategies which are more likely to be
1These papers elicit players’ beliefs using a proper quadratic scoring rule, such that for the players “telling the
truth” is optimal.
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played. In fact it correctly predicts the actual choices of around 80% of the players.
We also apply the procedure to other classes of 2x2 games and we analyze its relationship with
the Nash prediction. An interesting result is that the procedure selects a single outcome even in
games that have multiple Nash equilibria such that it contributes to the debate on equilibrium
selection (see Straub, 1995 and Haruvy and Stahl, 2004).
A number of studies that focus on how people play one shot simultaneous games and investigate
the issue of beliefs formation are closely related to this paper. For instance Stahl and Wilson
(1995), Costa-Gomes et al. (2000) and Camerer et al. (2004) hypothesize and test the existence
and relative importance of various archetypes of players that differ in the prior they have about
the degree of sophistication of their opponents. An important difference with respect to these
papers is that we do not consider heterogeneity. We recognize heterogeneity to be a very important
feature of human behavior but still here we favor simplicity. Therefore we only model the behavior
of the majority of players. Our contribution is to provide a fast, easy to implement and effective
procedure that gives rule of thumb predictions about the outcome one should expect to arise in
simple games.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the theoretical interpretations
and the empirical relevance of mixed strategy Nash equilibria. Section 3 presents the basic axioms
that must be satisfied by a belief function. Section 4 checks the compliance to these axioms of
various candidate functions and it shows that minimax regret is the unique one to obey them
all. Section 5 formally defines the procedure to be used to predict the outcome of simple games.
These predictions are then tested in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review on mixed equilibria
The idea that agents may randomize over a set of actions (i.e. they may use mixed strategies) dates
back to Borel (1921) and was then enriched and developed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944). The concept of Nash equilibrium appeared a few years after (Nash, 1951) and rapidly
became the most important solution concept of game theory. In his paper Nash also presented the
concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, a notion that leaded to the famous theorem about
the existence of a Nash equilibrium in any finite game.
In a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (shortened in what follows to MSNE) each player
randomizes over (some of) his pure strategies according to a probability distribution that makes
the other players indifferent about what to play. Therefore no player has any strict incentive to
deviate and the mixed strategy profile identifies a Nash equilibrium of the game.
The problem to look for this specific probability distribution shares quite many features with
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the following problem of elementary physics.
Exercise: You have a rigid rod of negligible weight which is 1 meter long. On one side of it
there is a weight of 1 Kg, on the other side a weight of 4 kg. Where does the rod have to be
pivoted in order for it to be in equilibrium?
Figure 1: the equilibrium problem.
The rod is in equilibrium if 4l1 = l2 where l1 + l2 = 1 and l1 is the distance from the pivot to
the weight of 4Kg and l2 is the distance from the pivot to the weight of 1Kg. Therefore l1 = 0.2m
and l2 = 0.8m. The pivot has to be put closer to the heavier side. Indeed 45 of the rod have to be
given to the lighter side in order to impose the equilibrium.
A similar situation arises when we compute MSNE: the equilibrium condition among pure
strategies is imposed and then, as a consequence, the appropriate probability distribution is
retrieved. And as it happens in the rod example, mixed equilibria often allocate larger probabilities
to “lighter” strategies, i.e. to strategies that are associated with lower payoffs.2 This feature
undermines the predictive power of MSNE. Another unappealing feature of mixed equilibria is
the so called “no own payoff effect” which will be shortly discussed.
To sum up MSNE often appear as quite an artificial construction and indeed they are still
problematic both in theory and in practice. To quote Rubinstein (1991): “The concept of mixed
strategy has often come under heavy fire”. On the theoretical side different interpretations have
been given about mixed equilibria and a general consensus is still missing.3 On the empirical side
the relevance of MSNE in capturing agents’ behavior has also been heavily questioned.
2The following game exactly mimics the rod example. And indeed the mixed equilibrium is given by

1
5
T + 4
5
B

for both players.
T B
T 4, 4 0, 0
B 0, 0 1, 1
3See for instance Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), Section 3.2.
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2.1 Theoretical interpretations of mixed equilibria
Taken at face value a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium prescribes a player to select the strategy
to play according to a specific probability distribution. In other words players should deliberately
randomize. This view may make sense when players are interacting in repeated games and they do
not want their pattern of play to be predictable.4 But in one shot interactions such a randomizing
behavior looks less realistic.
A second interpretation considers the MSNE probabilities as indicating the steady state fre-
quencies of pure strategies when games are played in large populations (see for instance Rosenthal,
1979). Each player chooses a pure strategy but in the entire population the MSNE distribu-
tion should emerge. Again this interpretation does not look appropriate in the context we are
interested in, namely a one shot interaction between two players.
Very much related with the ideas presented in this paper are the interpretations that link
MSNE with the beliefs of the players. Harsanyi (1973) presented the so called purification
interpretation of MSNE. The idea is that players play pure strategies. The twist is that each
player’s choice is based on some private information. This means that player i knows what to
play but the information sets of i’s opponents are not enough precise to allow them to be sure
about i’s choice. MSNE captures this uncertainty (or ignorance).
Aumann (1987) further simplified this idea. The claim (see also Aumann and Brandenburger,
1995 and Reny and Robson, 2003) is that, even in the absence of this small amount of private
information, players are still unsure about the opponents’ moves. Therefore the probability dis-
tribution that the MSNE assigns to player i can be directly interpreted as the beliefs all the
other players hold about i’s choice. We will come back to this point in Section 4.1.
2.2 Empirical relevance of mixed equilibria
Because of the existence of all these different theoretical interpretations, it is no surprise that
many experimental studies have been designed with the aim of testing the empirical relevance
of MSNE. In particular researchers focused on the study of matching pennies (MP) games, i.e.
games that have a unique Nash equilibrium which is in mixed strategies.5 The common design of
these experiments consisted in letting subjects repeatedly play the same version of a MP game.
Results show (for a detailed review see also Camerer, 2003) that long run frequencies of pure
strategies are not too far from the MSNE predictions. Still players’ behavior at an individual
4Evidences of such a mixing behavior appear in professional sports. See for instance Walker and Wooders (2001),
Chiappori et al. (2002) and Palacios-Huerta (2003).
5 Important contributions are Mookherjee and Sopher (1994), Ochs (1995), McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), Erev
and Roth (1998), McKelvey et al. (2000), Tang (2001) and Goeree et al. (2003).
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level is often significantly different from the one indicated by the equilibrium.
A different, and less investigated, question is to study how agents behave in front of a single
interaction.6 In a one shot MP game players cannot learn over time and the incentive to maintain
an unpredictable pattern of play simply does not exist. In these cases the MSNE prediction is
useless. In fact the equilibrium indicates a mixed distribution while the result of the game will
be a specific outcome given by the intersection of two pure strategies.
Our paper is focused on one shot games mainly for three reasons: first, we claim our theory
to be able to capture the behavior of inexperienced players; second, as just mentioned, one shot
individuals’ play has been less investigated; third, we think that enough real life situations are
more likely to be similar to one off events rather than to repeated interactions.
3 An axiomatic approach to model players’ beliefs in 2x2 games
We present some axioms that, in our view, capture some very basic properties of how the beliefs
of inexperienced and boundedly rational players should look like. These axioms are quite general
and therefore, perhaps unfortunately, they do not characterize a single belief function. Still they
are enough to clearly discriminate among various functions that are commonly used in game
theory and in decision theory. In fact, in order to find a function that may approximate players’
beliefs, we do not want to introduce new ad hoc formulas. At the opposite we rely on concepts
that already exist and that are widely used, though possibly for different purposes. Given that
the conjectured belief function will be used for predictive purposes, we perceive this to be a useful
result.
Consider the following game, where player i ∈ {A,B} can choose between strategies Hi and
Ti.
1)
HB TB
βHA HA a, · b, ·
βTA TA c, · d, ·
We model the beliefs player B holds about what player A will play. This is the reason why
the payoff matrix is incomplete and only the payoffs of player A appear. Whilst keeping in mind
the example of an inexperienced boundedly rational player, B’s beliefs are considered as being
just a function of player A’s payoffs. This may look like a drastic requirement but it can be seen
as a simplification of the fact that B’s beliefs are mainly a function of A’s payoffs and then, as
6A notable exception is Goeree and Holt (2004) that presents a model of iterated noisy introspection for one
shot interactions which is then tested over a large number of games.
6
a secondary effect that we do not consider, B’s beliefs may also be influenced by higher order
speculations that involve B’s payoffs.
The focus on B’s beliefs implies no loss of generality given that a similar analysis can be done
for what concerns A’ beliefs. We indicate with:
• βHA the beliefs player B hold about player A playing strategy HA
• βTA the beliefs player B hold about player A playing strategy TA
Finally we do not put any particular restriction on the values of the payoffs a, b, c and d.
According to us, player B’s belief function must obey to the following five axioms:
[A1] Functional form
βHA = βHA (a, b, c, d), βTA = βTA (a, b, c, d)
[A2] Consistency with probability distribution
βHA ≥ 0, βTA ≥ 0 and βHA + βTA = 1 for any a, b, c, d.
The first axiom simply formalizes what we already mentioned, i.e. the fact that B’s beliefs
have to be a function of the payoffs of player A. This implies that player B realizes A does respond
to changes in his own payoffs. This own payoff effect is a very robust feature of games played
in experiments (for clear evidences of this effect see, among others, Ochs, 1995 and Goeree and
Holt, 2001). The second axiom requires the function to identify a proper probability distribution,
i.e. beliefs that are non negative and that sum up to one. Notice that, because of the relation
βTA + βHA = 1, a single belief is enough to define the entire distribution. Therefore, from now
on, we focus on βHA .
[A3] Continuity
βHA is continuous in all its arguments.
[A4] Monotonicity
βHA is weakly increasing in a and b. βHA is weakly decreasing in c and d.
[A5] Consistency with rows or columns switch
Continuity (A3) is required since there are no evident reasons for B’s beliefs to jump in a
discrete way given small changes in the arguments of the function. The monotonicity axiom (A4)
7
defines the sign of the already mentioned own payoff effect and it is in line with a large amount of
experimental evidences (among others Ochs, 1995; Goeree and Holt, 2001; Goeree et al., 2003).
The axiom states that players believe their opponent to be more likely to play strategies that look
better. In other words if the payoffs associated with strategy HA increase then the probability
that player B assigns to the event of A playing that strategy cannot decrease.
The last axiom indicates that the beliefs of player B have to consistently react to the payoff
structure of the game and they do not depend on the labelling of the strategies. To better
understand the meaning of this axiom consider the two games that are reported below. With
respect to the original game (Game 1 above), Game 1
0
is such that the payoffs of the two rows
have been switched while Game 1
00
is such that the payoffs of the two columns have been switched.
Axiom 5 requires that, whenever a 6= c and b 6= d, the probability that B’s belief function allocates
to the event of A playing strategy HA in Game 1 must be equal to the probability that the same
function allocates to the event of A playing TA in Game 1
0
. In other words βHA = β
0
TA . At the
opposite the belief function must allocate the same probabilities to the events of A playing HA
in Game 1 and in Game 1
00
such that βHA = β
00
HA . In fact a column switch does not change the
relative attractiveness of strategies HA and TA from player A’s point of view.
1
0
)
HB TB
β
0
HA HA c, · d, ·
β
0
TA TA a, · b, ·
1
00
)
HB TB
β
00
HA HA b, · a, ·
β
00
TA TA d, · c, ·
4 The candidate functions
In this section we present various candidate functions and we check their compliance to the
axioms. We first analyze a number of proposals connected with the concept of mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium. Then we turn our attention to the minimax regret, a criterion normally used
in decision theory. In line with the axiomatic analysis of the previous section, we check how the
following functions perform in approximating the beliefs player B holds about what player A will
play in Game 1.
4.1 Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of player A
As mentioned in the literature review, the interpretation that mixed strategy equilibria could
capture players’ beliefs dates back to Harsanyi (1973) and it was later simplified by Aumann
(1987). According to Aumann’s view (see also Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995 and Reny and
8
Robson, 2003) the probability distribution that the MSNE attaches to player i represents the
common belief all the other players have about what i will play.
In the context of our 2x2 game this boils down to the hypothesis that A’s equilibrium dis-
tribution captures B’s beliefs. This interpretation suffers from one fundamental drawback. By
construction the MSNE of player A is exclusively a function of the payoffs of player B and it is
totally unrelated with A’s payoff. In the literature this unappealing feature of mixed equilibria
is called “no own payoff effect”. To make things clear consider Game 2 where, with respect to
Game 1, also the payoffs of player B appear.
2)
HB TB
βHA HA a, x b, y
βTA TA c, w d, z
The distribution that theMSNE assigns to player A is defined by the probability p˜ that makes
player B indifferent between playing HB or TB. Therefore p˜ solves p˜x+ (1− p˜)w = p˜y+ (1− p˜)z
such that p˜ = z−wx−y+z−w and the equilibrium component of player A is given by (p˜HA + (1− p˜)TA).
Interpreting this probability distribution as B’s beliefs we would have:
βHA =
z − w
x− y + z − w
Notice the counter intuitive implications of this proposal: B’s beliefs remain constant no
matter how A’s payoffs may change. For instance βHA = p˜ in the game above as well as in
a similar game where the payoff a (or b, c, d) is substituted with, let’s say, 5a. This proposal
therefore fails Axiom 1 and Axiom 4. Beliefs of this kind would not capture any own payoff
effect. This is a serious limitation given that the existence and the importance of such an effect
is testified by many experimental studies.
Notice furthermore that the predictive power of this proposal would be null. In fact any
strategy (or combinations of strategies) in the support of the MSNE of player B is a best
response to these conjectured beliefs.
4.2 Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of player B
The analysis of the previous section may suggest the use of the MSNE of player B as a way
to approximate B’s beliefs. Indeed the probabilities implied by the MSNE of B are a function
of A’s payoffs. More precisely the MSNE of B is given by (q˜HB + (1− q˜)TB) where q˜ solves
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q˜a+ (1− q˜)b = q˜c+ (1− q˜)d such that q˜ = d−ba−c+d−b and therefore, under this proposal, we would
have:
βHA =
d− b
a− c+ d− b
The problem with this formulation is that beliefs of this kind do not obey to the monotonicity
requirement. In fact βHA is decreasing in a and b and increasing in c and d while Axiom 4
requires the opposite behavior. Assume that payoffs a and b increase such as to make strategy
HA more attractive from A’s point of view. The probability weight that the MSNE attaches
to the correspondent strategy HB will get smaller (the intuition is the same provided by the rod
example presented in Section 2). Therefore the mixed equilibrium of player B does capture the
own payoff effect but with the wrong sign.
Trying to improve on the limits of the last proposal one may be tempted to approximate B’s
beliefs by switching the probabilities implied by the MSNE of B. In other words by setting
βHA = 1− q˜ such that:
βHA =
a− c
a− c+ d− b
This proposal is a function of A’s payoffs and it now satisfies the monotonicity axiom. Still
it fails Axiom 5. In fact, following this conjecture, player B should keep the same beliefs³
βHA = β
0
HA
´
also in game 1
0
(see before) where again the MSNE of B is given by q˜ = d−ba−c+d−b
such that 1− q˜ = β0HA . This would violate A5 whenever a 6= c and b 6= d.
4.3 A new proposal: the minimax regret
We now present a new and unusual candidate for approximating players’ beliefs. This proposal is
based on an instrumental use of the minimax regret criterion. More precisely we claim that the
beliefs of player j about what player i will play can be approximated by the minimax regret of
player i.
Minimax regret, originally proposed by Savage (1951), is a concept which found its main
applications as a selection criterion in decision theory (starting with Milnor, 1954).7 The minimax
regret criterion prescribes a player who has to make a decision under uncertainty to choose the
7More recently minimax regret has been used to model the behavior of subjects with limited rationality (Berg-
ermann and Schlag, 2005) as well as a way to deal with missing data in econometrics (Manski, 2005) and it also
appears in the artificial intelligence literature (Brafman and Tennenholtz, 2000).
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action that minimizes the maximum regret he may suffer. The regret of player i is defined as the
difference between the best payoff i could have got if he knew what his opponent (another player
or Nature) had played and the payoff player i actually got.
The first step to properly compute the minimax regret consists in building the regret matrix
which captures these differences. In the context of Game 1 (reproduced below) one needs to know
which is the largest payoff between a and c and between b and d. Let us assume that a > c and
d > b.8 In this case the regret matrix is given by R1:
1)
HB TB
βHA HA a, · b, ·
βTA TA c, · d, ·
R1)
HB TB
HA 0, · d− b, · (pr)
TA a− c, · 0, · (1− pr)
Strategy HA attains minimax regret if a − c > d − b while strategy TA attains minimax
regret with a reversed relation. Taking this specification as a belief function would clearly be
unsatisfactory given that such a proposal would fail the continuity axiom. The use of mixed
strategies solves this problem.
The mixed minimax regret is defined by the probability distribution (identified by p˜r, where
the index r indicates regret) that equalizes the expected regret of the two strategies. This optimal
p˜r solves p˜r (d− b) = (1− p˜r) (a− c) so that p˜r = a−ca−c+d−b . According to the conjecture of this
paper βHA = p˜r should hold and thus:
βHA =
a− c
a− c+ d− b
Once again, referring to Game 1 above, this means that player B approximately believes player
A will play strategy HA with probability a−ca−c+d−b and strategy TA with probability
d−b
a−c+d−b .
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It is easy to show that this candidate function obeys all the axioms. In fact βHA = βHA(a, b, c, d)
(A1), βHA ≥ 0, βTA ≥ 0 and βHA +βTA = 1 (A2), βHA is continuous in its arguments (A3) and it
also fulfills the monotonicity requirement (A4).10 Finally it also obeys Axiom 5. In fact, referring
to games 1
0
and 1
00
presented before, we have that p˜r = d−ba−c+d−b in Game 1
0
such that βHA = β
0
TA
and p˜r = a−ca−c+d−b in Game 1
00
such that βHA = β
00
HA .
8This assumption implies no loss of generality. It is in fact easy to show that the minimax regret proposal satisfy
the axioms also in the case of a < c and d < b as well as in the cases with weakly or strictly dominated strategies.
9These probabilities are analogous to the ones identified by the βHA = 1− q˜ proposal. Still the latter fails Axiom
5 while a belief function based on minimax regret fulfills this requirement. More in general in any 2x2 game where
a non degenerated MSNE exists, its probability distribution is either the same or the mirror image of the minimax
regret distribution of the other player (see Gallice, 2006b).
10First partial derivatives of βHA with respect to its arguments are given by:
∂βHA
∂a = −
∂βHA
∂c =
d−b
(a−b+d−c)2 ≥ 0
and
∂βHA
∂b = −
∂βHA
∂d =
a−c
(a−b+d−c)2 ≥ 0. Second derivatives show that βHA is concave in a and b and convex in c
and d.
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4.4 A summary and an example
The following table summarizes how the various proposals that we just discussed perform in
matching the five axioms11. Axioms are identified as: functional form (A1), consistency with
probability distribution (A2), continuity (A3), monotonicity (A4) and consistency with rows or
columns switch (A5).
candidates \ axioms A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
MSNE of pl. A Y N Y N Y
MSNE of pl. B Y Y Y N N
1 - MSNE of pl. B Y Y Y Y N
Pure minimax regret of pl. A Y Y N Y Y
Mixed minimax regret of pl. A Y Y Y Y Y
Table 1: compliance to the axioms of the candidate functions.
Among the various candidates, the (mixed) minimax regret proposal is the unique one to
satisfy all the axioms and thus the unique one to qualify for approximating players’ beliefs. Be-
fore properly defining a procedure which is based on these conjectured minimax regret beliefs,
we present a useful example. This example is meant to show how simple is the process of ap-
proximating beliefs using minimax regret, under lining once more the inadequacy of proposals
connected with the MSNE concept.
Consider Game 3 where k ∈ (−∞,∞) such that the game encompasses the cases of a matching
pennies game (for k ∈ (−1,∞)) and of a game with a dominant strategy (for k ∈ (−∞,−1]).
3)
HB TB
βHA HA k,−1 −1, 1
βTA TA −1, 1 1,−1
R1
k∈(−1,∞)
=
HB TB
HA 0, 2 2, 0
TA k + 1, 0 0, 2
R2
k∈[−∞,−1)
=
HB TB
HA −1− k, 2 2, 0
TA 0, 0 0, 2
For k ∈ (−1,∞) the regret matrix is given by R1. The minimax regret of player A is given
by (p˜rHA + (1− p˜r)TA) where p˜r = 1+k3+k . Following our proposal βHA =
1+k
3+k captures B’s beliefs
11Gallice (2006a) considers a richer set of axioms but the results of the analysis are analogous.
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about A playing strategy HA. This function appears as the bold concave curve in Figure 2 which
focuses on the beliefs of player B about what A will play.
For k ∈ (−∞,−1] the regret matrix is given by R2 such that p˜r = βHA = 0, i.e. player B
attaches a null probability to the event of A playing HA. In Figure 2 this appears as the bold line
that lies on the horizontal axis for k ≤ −1.
The other two functions (dashed lines) depict, respectively, the probability that the mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium assigns to player A playing strategy HA
¡
1
2
¢
and to player B playing
strategyHB
³
2
3+k
´
. The figure thus highlights the problems which were mentioned in the previous
section: the MSNE of player A does not respond to a change in A’s payoff while the MSNE of
player B does respond to a change in k but not in the desired direction. Notice that the functions
for the minimax regret and for theMSNE of the two players intersect just once. The intersection
happens for the unique k (in this case k = 1, symmetric game) for which all the three functions
reach a value of 12 .
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
0.5
1.0
k
Figure 2: beliefs approximation through minimax regret in Game 3.
5 The procedure
We use the conjectured minimax regret beliefs as a starting point for a procedure that selects the
strategies more likely to be played by inexperienced agents interacting in one shot 2x2 games.
In order to formalize this procedure, we consider a generic 2x2 game where Si = {Hi, Ti} and
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ui (si, sj) are the strategy space and the payoffs of player i with i, j ∈ {A,B}. The minimax
regret distributions (one for each player) are given by:
{(p˜AHA + (1− p˜A)TA) , (p˜BHB + (1− p˜B)TB)}
where p˜i defines the probability with which player i has to play strategyHi in order to minimize
his regret. With a slightly different notation with respect to the previous sections where only B’s
beliefs were considered, define now as βi = (θ, 1− θ) the beliefs of player i such that i believes
that player j will play strategies Hj with probability θ and strategy Tj with probability 1 − θ.
BRi(βi) is the best reply function of player i. It uses i’s beliefs as an input and provides as an
output the strategy that i must choose in order to maximize his expected payoff.
The procedure
1. Compute the minimax regret distribution for the two players and retrieve p˜A and p˜B.
2. Assign the following beliefs to the two players:
• βA = (p˜B, (1− p˜B))
• βB = (p˜A, (1− p˜A))
3. Let the two players choose the strategy to play according to BRi(βi):
• BRi(βi) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
{Hi} iff ui(Hi|βi) > ui(Ti|βi)
{Ti} iff ui(Hi|βi) < ui(Ti|βi)
{0.5Hi + 0.5Ti} iff ui(Hi|βi) = ui(Ti|βi)
The strategies selected by BRi(βi) are the ones which have the largest probability to be
played in a one shot game or, equivalently, the ones which we would expect to be chosen with
the highest frequency if the game is played in a large enough population. In particular whenever
ui(Hi|βi) 6= ui(Ti|βi) for any i then every player has a single best response and the intersection of
the two selected strategies indicates a single outcome of the game as the most likely one to arise.
The procedure thus provides a forecast in three simple steps: it is enough to compute the
minimax regret, use its probability distributions to approximate players’ beliefs and choose for
each player the strategy that best responds to these beliefs.12 We do not claim this procedure to
be consciously used by players. What we claim is that, on average, the procedure is operationally
valid, i.e. the majority of individuals play the game “as if” they were applying it.
12Notice that the procedure considers all the payoffs of the game. Beliefs of player i are mimicked by the minimax
regret probability distribution of the opponent j and thus they depend on the payoffs of the latter. But then, in
computing i’s best response, also i’s payoffs are taken into account.
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6 Experimental evidences about matching pennies games
We apply the proposed procedure to MP games for which experimental results are available from
other studies.13 Given that the procedure aims to capture the behavior of inexperienced players,
we only consider experiments where subjects played a single game just once. The data are reported
in Table 2.
The first three games (GH1, GH2 and GH3) and the correspondent experimental results
are taken from Goeree and Holt (2001). Each game was played once by a different pool of 50
subjects. In the original paper the authors use these games to evaluate the predictive power of
the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The last three games appear in Goeree and Holt (2004)
who took them from Guyer and Rapoport (1972). In the original experiment 214 subjects played
in a random order 244 games belonging to different typologies.
We now explain the meaning of the last four columns of Table 2. In the fourth to last column
we report BRi(βi), the strategy selected by the procedure. The third to last column presents
the experimental results in the form a/b Si, where a is the number of players that chose strategy
Si ∈ {Hi, Ti} and b = 0.5N is the total number of row or column players.
The second to last column shows the hit rate which measures the performance of the prediction
in forecasting actual behavior. The hit rate is a simple summary statistics which counts the
number of hits and it ranges between 0% (all misses) and 100% (all hits).14 Therefore, when
the procedure indicates a single strategy, the hit rate simply captures the percentage of players
who actually played it. In games in which the procedure indicates that subjects should uniformly
randomize and b is odd, the hit rate reaches 100% if the players split as equally as possible. In
game GH1 for instance the hit rate would have been 100% both if 12 or 13 out of the 25 row or
column players chose HA.
Finally in the last column of Table 2 we test for the validity of our conjecture, i.e. we test
the hypothesis of the procedure being able to ex ante predict the strategies that are overplayed.
Therefore we only consider the cases in which the procedure selects a pure strategy. Using a one
side test, we test if the proportion of players that plays BRi(βi) is significantly greater than 50%.
To do so we use the Fisher’s exact probability test which calculates the difference between the
data observed and an alternative data distribution. When our procedure selects a pure strategy
we expect the null hypothesis (observed data not being significantly different from the uniform
distribution) to be rejected. In other words we expect the p-value that appears in the last column
to be below 5%. An underlined p-value indicates that this is the case.
13With respect to the original papers strategies will be renamed in order to be consistent with previous sections.
14The hit rate is described in Verbeek (2004) and used for instance in Gneezy and Guth (2003).
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Game Notes Procedure Exper. Hit rate of Fisher
N selects results procedure p-values
HB TB
GH1 HA 80, 40 40, 80 1 shot 12HA+
1
2TA 12/25 HA 100% -
50 TA 40, 80 80, 40 12HB+
1
2TB 12/25 HB 100% -
GH2 HA 320, 40 40, 80 // HA 24/25 HA 96% 0.04%
50 TA 40, 80 80, 40 TB 21/25 TB 84% 1.6%
GH3 HA 44, 40 40, 80 // TA 23/25 TA 92% 0,18%
50 TA 40, 80 80, 40 HB 20/25 HB 80% 3,6%
GR4 HA 24, 5 5,−10 1 shot HA 91/107 HA 85% 0%
214 TA 26, 9 −10, 26 244 g. HB 85/107 HB 79% 0%
GR5 HA 15, 5 5,−10 // HA 82/107 HA 77% 0%
214 TA 26, 9 −10, 26 HB 81/107 HB 76% 0,01%
GR6 HA 9, 5 5,−10 // 12HA+
1
2TA 74/107 HA 62% -
214 TA 26, 9 −10, 26 TB 32/107 TB 30% 0,17%
Table 2: the hit rate of the procedure in one shot matching pennies games.
To have a better feeling of how the procedure actually works consider a couple of examples.
Game GH1 is a symmetric matching pennies game. The minimax regret is obviously 12Hi +
1
2Ti
for any i ∈ {A,B} and thus the procedure assigns uniform beliefs to both players. Both strategies
lead to the same expected payoff and the procedure predicts all outcomes to be equally likely.
Even if the population is quite small, actual frequencies confirm that the distributions of players’
choices are as uniform as possible.
In game GH2 the minimax regret distributions are given by
¡
7
8HA +
1
8TA
¢
and
¡
1
2HB +
1
2TB
¢
.
The procedure then selects strategies HA and TB given that these are the best responses to the
conjectured minimax regret beliefs.15 Strategy HA was actually chosen by 24 out of the 25 row
players (hit rate of 96%) and strategy TB was chosen by 21 of the 25 column players (84%).
15More precisely HA Â TA because 12 (320) + 12 (40) > 12 (40) + 12 (80) and TB Â HB because 78 (80) + 18 (40) >
7
8
(40) + 1
8
(80).
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The hit rate remains above 75% and the p-values are in line with our conjecture also in games
GH3, GR4 and GR5 while results are less good in the case of Game GR6 where the procedure
failed to predict that B players over played strategy HB.16 Considering only the games where the
procedure indicates a single outcome (GH2, GH3, GR4, GR5), the procedure correctly predicts
the choices of 81% of the players.
It can be easily shown that predictions based on letting players best respond to beliefs approx-
imated by the MSNE clearly under perform our procedure. We already mentioned the fact that
using the MSNE of player i to approximate j’s beliefs (Aumann, 1987) does not provide any
specific indication given that all the strategies of j are a best response to these beliefs. And to use
the MSNE of player i to approximate i’s beliefs often leads to misleading results (for instance in
Game GH2 the outcome selected would be (HA,HB) instead of (HA, TB)).
Moreover also interpreting MSNE as a prediction in itself (such that, for instance, players
A should uniformly randomize in all the three GH games given that his mixed equilibrium is
always 12HA+
1
2TA) is not effective. In fact it works fine only in the case of symmetric games (like
GH1) while it is clearly inadequate in the other games. Indeed Goeree and Holt (2001) present
the results of Game GH1 as supportive of the MSNE prediction, while they show the results of
games GH2 and GH3 as evidences of its failure. Therefore they write that “The Nash analysis
seems to work only by coincidence, when the payoff structure is symmetric and deviation risks are
balanced”.17
Analyzing the same results through the lens of our conjecture, it seems indeed that the fact
that the Nash analysis works in game GH1 is the result of a coincidence. But this coincidence
has an explanation. In symmetric MP games the probability distributions implied by theMSNE
and by the minimax regret always coincide.18 Still, as soon as the structure of the game becomes
asymmetric, individuals’ behavior is by far better captured by our behavioral model rather than
by the Nash prediction.
6.1 The procedure in other games
Until now we only considered the more problematic case of MP games but the procedure can be
applied to any 2x2 one shot game. The steps to select the strategies that inexperienced players
are more likely to choose remain the same: compute the minimax regret, use its probability
16Note that the payoffs structure of the GR games is more complex. Moreover, despite of the fact that games
were one shot, the huge number of strategic situations players had to face makes these data less appropriate to
study the behavior of inexperienced agents.
17Goeree, J. & Holt, C. (2001), “Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions”, Amer-
ican Economic Review, Vol. 91, pp. 1419.
18See the graphical example in Section 4.4; k = 1 identifies the symmetric case, i.e. the unique point for which
the functions for the minimax regret and for the MSNE intersect.
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distribution to approximate players’ beliefs and choose the pure strategies that best respond
to these beliefs. Table 3 presents examples of a game with a single dominant strategy (SD),
a prisoner’s dilemma (PD), a pure coordination game (PC), a stag-hunt game (SH) and a
symmetric (BS) and an asymmetric (aBS) battle of the sexes.
Game Minimax Best Procedure Notes
regret response selects
HB TB
SD HA 3, 1 1, 0 1HA+0TA HA (HA,HB) Unique
TA 1, 0 0, 2 13HB+
2
3TB HB NE
PD HA 3, 3 0, 5 0HA+1TA TA (TA, TB) Unique
5, 0 1, 1 0HB+1TB TB NE
PC HA 2, 2 0, 0 13HA+
2
3TA TA (TA, TB) Pareto dominant
TA 0, 0 4, 4 13HB+
2
3TB TB NE
SH HA 2, 2 3, 0 23HA+
1
3TA HA (HA,HB) Risk dominant
TA 0, 3 4, 4 23HB+
1
3TB HB NE
BS HA 3, 1 0, 0 34HA+
1
4TA {HA, TA} (·, ·) All outcomes
TA 0, 0 1, 3 14HB+
3
4TB {HB, TB} equally likely
aBS HA 5, 1 0, 0 56HA+
1
6TA HA (HA,HB) Payoff dominant
TA 0, 0 1, 3 14HB+
3
4TB HB NE
Table 3: the procedure applied to other classes of 2x2 games.
In accordance with theoretical predictions the procedure selects the unique Nash equilibrium
(NE) in the SD and PD games. For what concerns coordination games the procedure always in-
dicates a single outcome. With this respect it can therefore be considered as a tool for equilibrium
selection for games characterized by multiple equilibria. More precisely the procedure selects the
Pareto dominant equilibrium in pure coordination games (PC). This is in line with intuition,
theory and experimental results. More controversial is the indication for stag hunt games (SH),
i.e. games that have a Pareto dominant NE (more rewarding) and a risk dominant NE (less risky).
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The latter is the one indicated by the procedure. For this class of games experimental results
provide mixed indications (see for instance Harsanyi and Selten, 1988; Straub, 1995; Haruvy and
Stahl, 2004).
More in general, in games that have at least a NE in pure strategies, if the procedure selects
a single outcome, then this outcome is always a NE of the game (SD,PD,PC, SH and aBS).
However it may be the case that the procedure does not select any outcome (or better it selects
them all), even if pure Nash equilibria exist. This is what happens in the case of symmetric battle
of the sexes (BS) where the expected payoffs of the two strategies conditional on the conjectured
beliefs are equal. The situation is different in the asymmetric version of the game (aBS) where
the procedure selects the payoff dominant equilibrium. Both predictions are in line with empirical
evidences.
Finally notice that the conjectured minimax regret beliefs sometimes happen to be partially
incorrect, i.e. they do not find confirmation in the strategies selected by the opponent (see games
SD,BS, aBS). For instance in the SD game the row player expects his opponent to be biased
toward playing strategy TB but indeed, according to the procedure, player B chooses strategy
HB. We do not perceive this to be a problem. In fact we axiomatized the beliefs of inexperienced,
unsophisticated and boundedly rational players and therefore the possibility that the procedure
may assign incorrect beliefs was embedded in our model since the beginning. What matters is
that players actually play as if they were best responding to the minimax regret beliefs such that
the procedure is effective in predicting players’ behavior. In the case of the SD game for instance,
player A chooses his strictly dominant strategy (which is a best response to any possible belief)
and player B best responds with strategy HB.
7 Conclusion
2x2 one shot games remain a fundamental tool for modeling strategic interactions. These games
capture the simplest relations (the number of players and strategies is minimal) but still they
can be used to describe an uncountable number of situations. No wonder therefore that their
study has always attracted a lot of attention. Nevertheless the gap between theoretical models
and agents’ actual behavior often happens to be still wide. As a consequence, to predict players’
behavior in one off interactions remains a problematic issue.
This paper introduced a simple procedure to be used for forecasting the outcome of 2x2 one
shot games. Using an axiomatic approach, we looked for a function that may approximate the
beliefs of inexperienced and boundedly rational players. First we discussed various proposals con-
nected with the concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and we showed that these functions
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cannot be expected to satisfactorily mimic players’ beliefs. Then we showed that a belief function
based on an instrumental use of minimax regret succeeds in this task. The procedure simply lets
players behave as if they were responding to these conjectured minimax regret beliefs. Experi-
mental evidences confirm that the procedure is an effective tool for anticipating the moves of the
vast majority of the players.
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